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TAKING THE INTERSEXIONAL IMPERATIVE SERIOUSLY:
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND MARRIAGE REFORM
JANE S. SCHACTER*

I. INTRODUCTION

When we think about the construction of heterosexuality, we are
always, if only implicitly, thinking too about the construction of alternative sexualities and of sexuality itself. The articles in this symposium by
Professors Sterett and Ertman enrich our thinking about this fundamental
inquiry in important ways. Professor Sterett, with her nuanced and textured historical analysis of the emergence of pension and other benefits,
draws our attention to how the legal creation, regulation, and justification
of state-sponsored benefits helped to shape and reinforce normative conceptions of gender and sexual orientation.' Professor Ertman, with her
bold proposal for rectifying the longstanding, gendered economic inequalities associated with divorce, suggests that altering the terms on
which marital relationships are conducted and severed might be part of
re-constructing heterosexuality in significant ways.'
As I thought about these two articles, and particularly as I thought
about them in juxtaposition to one another, they raised for me a question
inspired by the idea of "interSEXionality" that is the organizing topic of
this symposium. I take the intersexionality imperative, if we can speak of
one, to include at least the notion that in assessing proposed legal interventions or reforms, we should consider the likely intersexional effects, if
you will, of such proposals. How are particular legal strategies likely to
affect not only the explicit problem to which they are immediately addressed, but the wider range of problems that are implicated by the complex links between and among related areas of concern? What, for example, might Professor Ertman's suggestion of a move to a regime of premarital security agreements mean for the construction of alternativethat is, non-dominant-sexualities? This is a subject that Ertman herself
addresses in considering how queer theorists might receive her proposal.!
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Juliet Brodie for her comments on an
earlier draft, and to the participants in the InterSEXionality Symposium for many thought-provoking
discussions.
1. See Susan Sterett, Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness& Dependence: Public Pensions in
the 1860s-1920s, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 1181 (1998).
2. See Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage:An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DENV.
U. L. REv. 1215 (1998) [hereinafter Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage]. For a more extended
exploration of Ertman's proposal, see Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage:A Proposal
for Valuing'Women's Work Through PremaritalSecurity Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998).
3. See Ertman, Reconstucting Marriage,supranote 2, at 1216-17, 1219-26.
4. See id. at 1228-34.
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In thinking about difficult questions like these, I want to consider
more generally the problem of how to conceptualize and predict the intersexional effects of proposed legal reforms. This problem is, I think,
part of a large and difficult set of questions for progressive legal scholars: How will particular strategies be received, understood, and shaped in
the diffuse, collective social processes that give meaning to these strategies over time? Is it possible to maintain progressive "ownership" of
particular strategies once they become part of these collective processes
and thus become subject to appropriationby diverse forces and to domestication in ways that are sometimes hard to predict or control?
Professor Sterett's article provides a rich point of conceptual departure from which to pursue these questions, illuminating as it does how
the legal device of the pension, and its doctrinal grounding, emerged
within, and functioned to reinforce, a system of starkly gendered relations. By tracing the ways in which pension benefits were justified and
grounded in naturalized conceptions of masculinity and femininity, the
article exposes important links between legal and cultural forces.' With
this framework in mind, I will probe potential intersexional effects of,
first, Professor Ertman's proposal for premarital security agreements, and
second, some contemporary advocacy for same-sex marriage. My focus
in terms of same-sex marriage will be on an intersection suggested by the
Sterett and Ertman articles: the nexus between sexuality, gender, and
poverty. I will explore the intersexional implications of some defenses of
same-sex marriage for poor women and, in particular, poor women who
are single mothers.
II. THE PREMARITAL SECURITY AGREEMENT REGIME AND ASSESSING
THE INTERSEXIONAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS

Professor Ertman proposes to import the commercial law device of
security agreements into the family law realm and to reconceive primary
homemakers (usually women) as creditors and primary wage-earners
(usually men) as debtors. The move to a regime of premarital security
agreements is, of course, motivated in the first instance by gender concerns, and more particularly by concerns for the impoverishing effect of
divorce on women who have Worked extensively or exclusively in the
home, rather than the market. Ertman makes a strong case for how the
effects of such agreements might ameliorate the economic inequities she
identifies, and how, surprisingly, her proposal might even generate an
ideologically diverse coalition of legal economists and feminists of
varying stripes.8

5.
6.
7.
8.

See Sterett, supra note 1.
See id.
See Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage,supra note 2, at 1216-17, 1219-26.
See id. at 1225-26.
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I want to focus on the capacity of premarital security agreements to
affect the nature and contours of gender relations, and in turn to participate in reshaping not only dominant conceptions of heterosexuality, but
of alternative sexualities as well. How should we think about the capacity
of the Ertman legal proposal to affect this broader range of social meanings and practices? On this point, the proposal strikes me as quite paradoxical in having the potential both to reinforce a deeply gendered status
quo that supports heterosexual normativity and to open some dramatically liberatory paths away from that status quo.
The road to retrenchment lies, I fear, in the incentive structure created by the proposal. By attempting to ameliorate the economic inequalities that fall on homemakers, the proposal may also produce an economic
incentive for women to remain or become full or part-time homemakers,
with primary child care responsibilities and all that goes along with that.
Making it financially more attractive to adopt that role may well reinforce the gendered status quo that is the subject of Professor Sterett's
historical analysis-the status quo that sends more men into the market
(Sterett's world of "danger") 9 and keeps more women in the home (Sterett's world of "dependency").'" Reinforcing those gendered patterns, in
turn, may well entrench cultural norms of femininity and masculinitythe very norms that Professor Sterett traces in her analysis of the
gendered justification of early pension benefits. Doing so, moreover,
might well shore up traditional gender scripts in ways that are distinctly
inhospitable to the gender transgressions posed by non-heterosexuals.
Professor Ertman anticipates these issues in her article. She points
out that her proposal is gender-neutral, and so might be thought to give
men an incentive to abandon the market in favor of the home." But while
the legal proposal is gender-neutral, the world is not; indeed, just this fact
is what moves Professor Ertman in the first instance. Absent cultural
change to accompany legal change-a point I will discuss further-formal equality measures in a world of substantive inequality tend to reproduce the underlying inequalities, and to be shaped and driven by existing
social dynamics.' 2 Under current social conditions, in other words, premarital security agreements standing alone are more likely to track than
to disrupt the gendered status quo.
Professor Ertman also argues that the additional "exit options"'3 that
the premarital security interest will create may well empower women
financially, and as a result, perhaps even culturally." Here, though, I

9. See Sterett, supra note 1, at 1187-93.
10. See id. at 1198-1204.
11. See Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage,supra note 2, at 1230-31.
12. For further discussion of this point, see Jane S.Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay
Civil Rights Debate in a Post-CivilRights Era, 110 HARV. L. REv. 684, 721 (1997).
13. Ertman, ReconstructingMarriage, supra note 2, at 1229.
14. Id. at 1229-31.
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think there is an important point to be made about the predictive enterprise I am suggesting. When we try to assess the intersexional effects of
legal reforms, we need to think beyond the specific policy results that
particular proposals can induce, such as giving women new financial
advantages. We also need to consider self-consciously the cultural
meaning that reforms are likely to have-that is, the larger public understandings that are likely to attach to measures like a premarital security
agreement. Particularly because it may be that only a relatively small or
demographically privileged group would actually use premarital security
agreements," the ways that these new agreements come to be publicly
framed and perceived might prove to be more significant than any concrete effects that such agreements may produce for those who enter into
them. And here there is risk, for it seems to me that the measure might
well come to be understood to reflect, although it is surely not motivated
by, a social commitment to gendered role division in heterosexual marriage. Indeed, Professor Ertman acknowledges this risk, yet argues that
even a failed reform can be preferable to a bad status quo by creating the
possibility of future change.'6 I am not so sure. Retrenchment can be
pretty bleak.
There is, however, another way to think about how premarital security agreements, if operationalized, might come to be culturally understood, and here is where the paradox that I see arises. Perhaps the path
charted by this proposal might be one that does not reinforce, but rather
contributes to dislodging, the gendered status quo. What I find among the
most conceptually appealing aspects of the proposal is the very act of
importing commercial law into the realm of marriage, a realm that is
conventionally regarded as sanctified and somehow above the nasty
business of commerce. Reconceiving husbands and wives in the language of debtors and creditors, and inserting Article 9 security agreements into the cultural domain traditionally inhabited by vows and valentines, has the capacity to jolt and to challenge conventional understandings about what marriage is, what it does. Professor Ertman's proposal might thus contribute to the project-vital in my view-of demystifying marriage by reconceiving committed heterosexual partnerships in
the frank and unadorned vocabulary of commercial exchange."
Ertman's idea strikes me as one important part of a larger project of
distinguishing the legal rights, benefits, and status of marriage, on the
one hand, from the complex constellation of symbols, rituals, traditions,
and various moral, religious, and social trappings of marriage, on the
other hand. These two elements are conventionally, but unconvincingly,

15.
16.
17.
argument

Ertman recognizes this potential limitation. See id. at 1249-50.
Id. at 1234.
For a historical analysis of the regulation of heterosexuality and a comprehensive
in favor of applying a bargaining framework to the politics of heterosexuality, see LINDA

R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998).
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presented as an undifferentiated whole. The sober scrutiny of marriage
that is inherent in a proposal that emphasizes the commercial qualities
and potentialities of marriage offers one way to press that point and to
begin to break apart the contested meanings of marriage as an institution.
Reconceiving and reconstructing marriage in this way, moreover, can
contribute to creating a world that includes and enables what I think of as
a genuine pluralism of affiliative structures. I use this term to describe a
world in which marriage might coexist with a flexible domestic partnership structure that can accommodate partnerships of different sorts, established under different conditions, with widely different aspirations
and conceptions of the good in mind. "
Which of these two paths-retrenchment or progress-could we expect a codified Ertman proposal to go down? It is hard to say, and I do
not think this paradoxical set of potential intersexional consequences is at
all unique to Ertman's proposal. This uncertainty will frequently arise
where progressive legal reforms are concerned, which is just what makes
this sort of inquiry complex. The basic dilemma is that the progressive
roots and motivations of a particular legal reform might not be the forces
that frame and determine that reform's meaning once it is operative.
Worse still, ex ante predictions of this kind are elusive and difficult.
I do not suggest that we can eliminate uncertainty of this kind, but
there a few ways to address and perhaps to ameliorate it. First, we should
simply think about these questions directly. That is, we should ask the
intersexional questions-as Professor Ertman laudably does in her contribution to this symposium-and should embrace and specifically consider the possibility that paradoxical consequences may flow from wellintentioned interventions. Launching this inquiry means making deliberative, though surely imperfect, judgments about how best to steer proposals in their intended direction. Second, we should recognize that legal
strategies alone are often unlikely to be autonomous sources of deep social change, and have to be paired with cultural and other strategies, and
conceptualized in terms of the dynamic, mutually constitutive relationship between legal and social forces.' 9 All of this suggests to me that as
we consider what road a premarital security agreement regime might take
us down, we should think about accompanying strategies that can influence the outcome. For example, expressly situating the proposal within a
package of comprehensive strategies aimed squarely at reconceiving the
cultural meaning of marriage, or deliberately designing the proposal so
that it might be used by unmarried partners as well, reflect two ideas of
this kind.

18. Indeed, a robust pluralism of affiliative structures would also allow for non-affiliation, and
would rethink fundamentally the linkage of important rights and benefits like health insurance
coverage with long-term interpersonal commitment. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is
Marriagea Path to Liberation?,6 OuT/LOOK: NAT'L LESBIAN & GAY Q. 9, 16-17 (1989).
19. This point is explored at greater length in Schacter, supra note 12, at 719-23.
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II. INTERSEXIONAL EFFECTS OF CONTEMPORARY SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE ADVOCACY

We can extend this kind of analysis to an issue suggested, though not
addressed, in the panel articles-same-sex marriage advocacy. Professor
Sterett's historical analysis of early welfare state programs, and the conceptions of gender and sexuality embedded within them, invites us to
think about similar issues in the context of the contemporary welfare
state." One way to conceptualize this inquiry would be to ask a question
parallel to Sterett's historical question: How do the legal structures that
today define and govern welfare benefits participate in constructing gender and sexuality?2' Although I will touch on that question, I want to take
a somewhat different perspective here, one that is consistent with my
theme of considering the intersexional effects of particular strategies and
legal interventions.
I will focus on contemporary advocacy for same-sex marriage rights
and explore some of the possible intersexional effects of that advocacy
on issues relating specifically to poor women in the welfare state today.22
In doing so, I suggest that there are some highly problematic intersexional dimensions here, ones that should influence the course of future
advocacy. I do not, in doing so, seek to join here the larger debate among
proponents of gay equality about the wisdom of seeking same-sex marriage rights. That debate has been ably engaged by, among others, Bill
Eskridge, "3 Paula Ettlebrick, ' Nan Hunter, Darren Hutchinson,26 Nancy
20. See Sterett, supra note 1.
21. See generally Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 274. Fineman argues that the welfare system, with its goal of eliminating single motherhood,
favors, and pushes individuals into, a traditional nuclear family structure, with the father as financial
provider and mother as homemaker. Id. at 277-93; see id. at 276 ("[Tlhe ideology of patriarchy is
the most instrumental force in the creation and acceptance of discourses about Mothers in our
society.").
22. Cf Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage,supra note 2, at 1248 (recognizing the potential of
PSA's to "exacerbate rather than alleviate the marginalization of poor people and many women of
color").
23. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 84-85 (1996) (arguing
that claims made by gay "marriage critics are too speculative to overcome the presumption of
equality").
24. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition,
5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 114 (1996) (arguing that gay and lesbian rights advocates should be cautious in
arguing for same-sex marriage and should pursue "more inclusive social and legal policies that
would bestow respect and benefits upon all who assume the responsibility and functions of familywhether they are married or not"); see also Ettelbrick, supra note 18.
25. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9,
12 (1991) (arguing that "legalization of lesbian and gay marriage and the adoption of domestic
partnership provisions are incomplete unless the other option also exists, and that they need to be
analyzed as part of the feminist inquiry into how both private and public law reinforce power
imbalance in family life").
26. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and PoliticalDiscourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561, 586-602 (1996) (arguing that many samesex marriage advocates essentialize the gay/lesbian experience, ignoring vital racial and class
differences among members of the gay and lesbian community).
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Polikoff," Tom Stoddard,2" and Andrew Sullivan.29 My focus will be
much more targeted.
It will break no new ground to recognize that it has been a consistent
strategy of so-called "welfare reformers" to brutally stigmatize single
mothers-that subgroup of mothers who, as Martha Fineman has pointed
out, must be marked as "single" to separate them from unmodified
"mothers," who by definition are to be taken as married." In contemporary political discourse, it passes without much controversy to blame
single mothers, especially poor ones, for a wide array of social ills, including, most ironically, poverty itself. Indeed, as Fineman's work has
shown, single mothers are routinely identified as both the cause and the
result of poverty, and inhabit a category that is itself imbued with a
strong dose of moral blame."
Although this long-running rhetorical strategy has powerfully shaped
contemporary discourse, the phenomenon is hardly limited to rhetoric.
Increasingly, the pressure for single mothers to marry is finding its way
into the law. Consider, for example, state experiments with so-called
"bridefare," which create financial incentives to marry.32 Moreover, the
1996 federal welfare reform bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,"3 enshrines this view of single
mothers both in its legislative findings and within the law itself. Con27. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV.
1535, 1549-50 (1993) (arguing that advocacy of lesbian and gay marriage will "require a rhetorical
strategy that emphasizes similarities between our relationships and heterosexual marriages, values
long-term monogamous coupling above all other relationships, and denies the potential of lesbian
and gay marriage to transform the gendered nature of marriage for all people").
28. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, 6 OuT/LoOK:
NAT'L LESBIAN & GAY Q. 9, 9 (1989) (arguing that, despite the historically oppressive structures of
the marriage construct, gay rights advocates should seek legal recognition of same-sex marriages
because the economic advantages and legal rights that marriage confers upon individuals will futher
both equal rights and the transformation of the current institution of marriage).
29. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 178-79 (1995) ("Marriage is not simply a
private contract; it is a social and public cognition of a private commitment. As such, it is the highest
public recognition of personal integrity. Denying it to homosexuals is the must public affront
possible to their public equality.").
30. Fineman, supra note 21, at 291.
31. MARTHA ALBERSTON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106-18 (1995). See generally Linda J. Lacey, As
American As Parenthood and Apple Pie: Neutered Mothers, Breadwinning Fathers, and Welfare
Rhetoric, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 79, 79 & n.1 (1996) (reviewing FINEMAN, supra, and DAVID
BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM
(1995)) ("Rhetoric about the dangers that single mothers pose to society has reached a fever pitch in
the last decade. Critics blame single mothers for poverty, crime, drug addiction, and the breakdown
of western culture as we know it.").
32. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-3.4 to 3.7 (West 1993) (repealed 1997) (providing that
children whose parents marry shall have their benefits 'continued); see also Julie Kosterlitz, The
MarriagePenalty, 24 NAT'L J. 1454, 1455-56 (1992) (discussing a similar proposal in Wisconsin).
33. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
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sider, for example, these legislative findings that appear in the congressional preamble to the welfare reform law:
"Marriage is the foundation of a successful society."
"Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which
promotes the interests of children."
"The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the
mother, the child, the family, and society are well documented .. "
"The negative consequences of raising children in single-parent
homes are well documented ....34
Beyond making these specific findings, Congress in 1996 enacted a
block grant system, affording states considerable latitude in creating their
own welfare systems, but requiring that federal funds be used in ways
that further the stated purposes of the law-including, as set forth in the
statute, to "encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families.""
At the very time that welfare reformers unrelentingly hammer poor
women for not marrying, and at the very time that marriage is so aggressively pressed in law and in political rhetoric as a panacea for poverty
and a magical route to deliverance for poor women, the debate over
same-sex marriage rages. I number myself firmly among those who wish
that the same-sex marriage debate had not been joined at this particular
moment in history-a moment when the forces of so-called family values wield considerable power, as the passage of the Defense of Marriage
Act36 and its many state law analogues37 painfully reflect. In my view,
however, once the same-sex marriage debate was joined, advocates of
sexual equality were left with little choice but to oppose current marriage
law, which imposes a formal, legal inequality on lesbians and gay men.
Even still, advocates and academics do have crucial choices to make
about what strategies and theories to pursue in advocacy.
I am particularly concerned with strategies that valorize and romanticize marriage, as my earlier discussion might suggest that I would be. In
34. These congressional findings are among those made in connection with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families program. The findings appear in the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (Supp. H11996) (Congressional Findings)), reprinted in JULIE A.
NICE & LoutSE G. TRUBEK, POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACIcE 619-20 (1997).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(4) (Supp. I1996).
36. The Defense of Marriage Act denies federal recognition to same-sex marriages and
legislatively authorizes states to deny recognition to same-sex marriages that may be performed in
other states. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. H 1996), and 28 U.S.C.§ 1738C (Supp. II 1996)).
37. State statutory analogues to this federal law generally deny recognition to any same-sex
marriage that may be performed in another state. For an overview of the Defense of Marriage Act
and cognate state laws, see Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEx. L. REv. 921 (1998).
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a general sense, I fear that strategies like these will undermine the real
pluralism of affiliative structures that I think we should seek.3" More specifically, I fear that these strategies draw same-sex marriage advocatesunintentionally, to be sure-into the lamentable larger dynamics that
sustain contemporary single-mother bashing.39 Various advocates today
argue, for example, that marriage has a uniquely "civilizing" capacity,'
that marriage marks a uniquely "deep" commitment to society and by the
partners to one another," and that2 marriage should be pursued for the
"social recognition" that it brings. These sorts of arguments can fuelin ways that can be as real as they are unintended-the stigmatization
and relentless condemnation of poor single mothers. After all, to
characterize marriage as civilizing is to imply the uncivilized character of
those outside the institution. To posit marriage as marking a unique form
of commitment seems inescapably to devalue other family arrangements.
And, to crave the social recognition that marriage brings is to accept at
face value that very social recognition, rather than to question and resist
its far-reaching effects.
While arguments like these may be shrewd when measured against
the near-term goal of winning more popular support for gay marriage
rights in the current political climate, they are troubling in light of their
pernicious intersexional effects. By validating the conventional wisdom
that posits marriage as society's "very foundation," and by pressing the
good, socially acceptable behavior of many marriage-aspiring sexual
minorities, these strategies become complicitous in the dominant discourse that makes marriage a compulsory part of citizenship, and that
penalizes-harshly, as contemporary welfare reform measures suggestmany who are unmarried.
Here again, there is complexity and uncertainty in attempting to
measure the intersexional effects of a legal strategy. The problems I point
out may be either less or more severe than I have suggested. The problems may be less severe because I am underestimating the intrinsically
radical potential of same-sex marriage-whatever advocacy strategy is
used-to destabilize gender and convention, and in turn, to transform the

38. Cf.Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 583-636 (arguing that pro-marriage strategies deployed
by gay rights proponents work to erase and obscure the experiences and needs of gays and lesbians
who are poor or of color).
39. By stressing this aspect of the problem, I do not mean to erase other ways in which
advocacy for same-sex marriage may create undesirable effects, such as by creating hierarchies
within the gay and lesbian community that disfavor those who may choose not to marry. See
Ettelbrick, supra note 18, at 16 ("Ironically, gay marriage, instead of liberating gay sex and
sexuality, would further outlaw all gay and lesbian sex which is not performed in a marital
context.").
40. ESKRIDGE, supra note 23, at 8-13.
41. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 182.
42. Evan Wolfson, Same-Sex Marriages:PRO-Two Sides Debate Issue Before Congress and
the Courts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 23, 1996, at 1J.

1264

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4

institution of marriage 3 into something that cannot be so readily used to
subordinate poor women. (Perhaps this might explain why the same
Congress that passed welfare reform, after all, also passed the Defense of
Marriage Act). Or it may be more severe than I think because my focus
on particular advocacy strategies may be too marginal. Given the current
context, perhaps any social demand for entry into the institution of marriage will inevitably serve to buttress the power of the institution itself
and so to enable and encourage its reactionary political uses. The details
of how the marriage claim is framed may simply be too nuanced and
subtle for the crude collective politics of meaning that help to shape public understandings.
True, there are no easy or irrefutable ways to gauge intersexional effects like these. But, again, we ought to ask the intersexional question
and craft arguments and strategies with intersexional considerations in
mind. In the domain of the marriage struggle, that means disclaiming
strategies that valorize marriage and pursuing strategies that are, instead,
explicitly rooted in a vision of real pluralism and justice, broadly construed. This means accepting a responsibility to participate selfconsciously in constructing and re-constructing heterosexuality and alternative sexualities with careful attention to the broad and diverse range
of interests affected by these processes of construction.

43. See generally Hunter, supra note 25 (arguing that the legalization of gay and lesbian
marriage will potentially destabilize the gender-based definition of marriage, and thus have effects
beyond the gay and lesbian communities).

